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When nobody or nothing notices an error, it may turn into 
patient harm. We show that medical devices ignore many 
errors, and therefore do not adequately support patient 
safety. In addition to preventable patient harm, errors may be 
reported ignoring potential fl aws in medical device design, and 
front line staff may be inappropriately blamed. We present 
some suggestions to improve reporting and the procurement 
of hospital equipment.
KEYWORDS: XXXX
Commercial air travel didn’t get safer by exhorting pilots 
to please not crash. It got safer by designing planes and 
air travel systems that support pilots and others to succeed 
in a very, very complex environment. We can do that in 
healthcare, too. – Don Berwick
Computing’s central challenge, ‘How not to make a mess of 
it,’ has not been met. On the contrary, most of our systems 
are much more complicated than can be considered healthy, 
and are too messy and chaotic to be used in comfort and 
confidence – Edgser Dijkstra
Introduction
If preventable error in hospitals was a disease, it would be a 
big killer; recent evidence suggests that preventable error is 
the third biggest killer, after heart disease and cancer.1 Worse, 
the death rates for error are likely to be an underestimate; 
for example, if somebody is in hospital because of cancer, 
if an error occurs their death is unlikely to be recorded as 
‘preventable error’ when it is far easier to say the disease took its 
inevitable course. 
Healthcare has rising costs, increasing expectations, and 
we are getting older and more obese, increasingly suffering 
from chronic diseases like diabetes. However we might try to 
interpret the evidence, it is clear that healthcare is in crisis.
One would imagine that computers (IT) would be part of 
the solution. IT, new technologies, and the ‘paperless NHS’ are 
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all frequently pushed as obvious ways forward. In fact, while 
computers make every industry more effi cient, they don’t help 
healthcare.2 Healthcare is now widely recognised as turning 
into an IT problem.3 Conversely, improving IT will improve 
every aspect of healthcare.
By contrast, we know drug side effects are expected and 
unavoidable, so we would be skeptical if the latest ‘wonder 
drug’ could be all that it was trying to promise. We rely on a 
rigorous process of trials and review before drugs are approved 
for general use,4 and we expect a balance between the benefi ts 
of taking a drug and suffering from its side effects. The review 
process protects us. Yet there is no similar review or assessment 
process for healthcare IT systems, whether they are medical 
devices, patient record systems, incident reporting systems, 
scanners or other complex devices.
It is tempting to blame hospital staff for errors, but wrong 
because system defects almost always play a part.5 Error should 
be considered the unavoidable side effect of IT; therefore, IT 
systems should be better regulated to manage side effects. 
A selection of illustrative problems 
There are many reasons why it is potentially wrong to blame the 
healthcare practitioner following a clinical incident, especially 
one that involves a medical device. A fi rst step in clearer 
thinking would be to call error ‘use error’ since calling it ‘user 
error’ prejudges the user as the cause, when all we know is that 
an error happened during use. Furthermore, once somebody is 
blamed it is tempting to look no further for other causes, and 
then nobody learns anything and the system won’t be changed. 
The problem will reoccur.
Assuming the design is right
At the Beatson Oncology Centre in Glasgow, software was 
upgraded and the implications were not reviewed. The original 
forms for performing calculations continued to be used, and as 
a result a patient, Lisa Norris, was overdosed. Sadly, although 
immediately surviving the overdose, she died. The report6 was 
published just after her death, and says:
Changing to the new Varis 7 introduced a specific feature 
that if selected by the treatment planner, changed the nature 
of the data in the Eclipse treatment Plan Report relative to 
that in similar reports prior to the May 2005 upgrade […] 
the outcome was that the figure entered on the planning form 
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for one of the critical treatment delivery parameters was 
significantly higher than the figure that should have been 
used […] the error was not identified in the checking process 
[…] the setting used for each of the first 19 treatments [of Lisa 
Norris] was therefore too high.
It should be noted that at no point in the investigation was it 
deemed necessary to discuss the incident with the suppliers of 
the equipment [Varis 7, Eclipse and RTChart] since there was 
no suggestion that these products contributed to the error.
This appears to be saying that whatever a computer system 
does, it is not to be blamed for error provided it did not 
malfunction: the revised Varis 7 had a feature that contributed 
to a use error, but the feature was selected by the operator. 
Indeed, the report dismisses examining the design of the Varis 7 
(or why an active piece of medical equipment needs a software 
upgrade) and instead concentrates on the management, 
supervision and competence of the operator who made ‘the 
critical error’. It appears nobody evaluated the design of the new 
Varis 7, nor the effect of the changes to its design, despite an 
internal memorandum some months earlier querying unclear 
control of purchased software.
Blaming the user
In 2001 the radiographer Olivia Saldaña was involved with the 
treatment of 21 patients who died from radiation overdoses. 
Treatment involves placing metal blocks to protect sensitive 
parts of the patient’s body, and calculating the correct radiation 
dose given that the blocks restrict the treatment aperture. 
Saldaña drew the shapes of the blocks on the computer 
screen, but the computer system did not perform the correct 
calculation because of a bug of which Saldaña was unaware. 
Multidata Systems, the manufacturer, was aware of the bug in 
1992, and the computer should have detected and highlighted 
its inability to do the correct calculation.7 In spite of this, 
Saldaña was imprisoned for manslaughter. 
Not exploring what happened
Kimberly Hiatt made an out-by-ten calculation error for 
intravenous calcium chloride for a very ill baby, Kaia Zautner, 
who died, though it was not obvious whether the overdose 
contributed to the death. Hiatt reported the error and was 
escorted from the hospital, and she subsequently committed 
suicide; the ‘second victim’ of the incident.8 Notably, after her 
death the Nursing Commission terminated their investigation, 
so we will never know exactly how the incident occurred,9,10 
and we will not be able to learn to help fi nd out how to 
improve safety.
How did the miscalculation occur? It is possible Hiatt made 
a keying slip on a calculator, such as pressing a decimal point 
twice, resulting in an incorrect number without the calculator 
reporting the possibility of error; or perhaps the pharmacy 
computer had printed an over-complex drug label that was 
too easy to misread? It is possible some of the equipment 
(calculator, infusion pump etc) had a bug and, despite being 
used correctly, gave the wrong results. In the next section we 
show that calculators are very different and prone to error; it 
is surprising that the calculation that Hiatt performed was not 
analysed more closely before assuming Hiatt was at fault.
Calculators have systematic but varied faults
Handheld calculators are used throughout healthcare but 
are fallible. As a simple example, we live in Swansea, and we 
are interested in our epidemiological studies of the Welsh 
population. We might therefore wish to calculate what 
proportion of the world’s population live in Wales. The 
calculation required is the population of Wales divided by the 
population of the world, namely 3,063,500÷6,973,738,433 at the 
time of writing. Three attempts at this calculation obtain the 
results presented in Table 1 (ignoring least signifi cant digits).
Only the last answer is correct. These are market-leading 
products, yet none report any error. The Apple iPhone could 
clearly report a possible error since it provides two different 
answers even if it doesn’t know which one is right!
The fi rst electronic calculators appeared in the 1960s. We are 
no longer constrained by technology, and we’ve had some fi fty 
years to get their designs right. It is hard to understand why 
calculators used in healthcare are not safer.
Ubiquitous design faults
The Zimed AD Syringe Driver is, according to its website,11 
‘a ground-breaking new infusion device that takes usability 
and patient safety to new levels […] Simple to operate for 
professionals, patients, parents, or helpers.’ Its design quality is 
typical of modern medical devices.
The Zimed permits error that it ignores, potentially allowing 
very large numerical errors.12 One cause for concern are over-
run errors: a nurse entering a number such as 0.1 will move 
the cursor to enter the least signifi cant digits of the intended 
number, but an over-run (too many move-right key presses) 
will silently move the cursor to the most signifi cant digit. Thus 
an attempt to enter 0.1 could accidentally enter 1000.0 by just 
one excess keystroke with no warning to the user. 
The B-Braun Infusomat, a popular infusion pump, has a 
similar user interface to the Zimed, but has a different problem. 
If a user tries to enter 0.01 ml it gets silently converted to 
0.1 ml, with no warning to the user the number is not what 
was entered. 
On the Baxter Colleague 3, another infusion pump, entering 
100.5 will be silently turned into 1005; the decimal point is 
ignored, again with no warning to the user.
These types of design fault are all possible causes of Hiatt’s 
overdosing; they are particularly worrying in that they are silent 
problems that do not warn the user. Almost all devices we have 
examined suffer from similar fl aws of sloppy programming. 
It is possible that the manufacturers will read these criticisms 
and fi x their software, which is good, except it will create the 
problem that for a time there will be multiple versions of the 
user interfaces to confuse users further. It is surprising these 
Table 1. Calculated fraction of population.
Calculator used Calculated fraction of the 
world’s population in Wales
Casio HS-8V 0.04
Apple iPhone, held portrait 0.004
Apple iPhone, held landscape 0.0004
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simple design defects were not eliminated during product 
development.
Calculation problems
Denise Melanson was given an overdose of intravenous 
chemotherapy. Her death was followed by a Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) published by the Institute of Safe Medication 
Practices.13 Elsewhere we have criticised the diffi cult calculation 
aspects of the infusion14 and shown how design problems can 
be avoided, but here we highlight two issues raised by the simple 
two-hour experiment performed as part of the RCA.
Three out of six nurses participating in the experiment 
entered incorrect data on the Abbot AIM Plus infusion pump: 
all were confused by some aspect of its design. Three did not 
choose the correct millilitre option (the infusion pump displays 
ml per hour as ml) — one nurse selected mg/ml instead. Some 
were confused with the infusion pump using a single key for 
both decimal point and mode-changing arrow key.
The drug bag label generated by the pharmacy was confusing: 
it had over 20 numbers printed on it, causing information 
overload. One of these was 28.8, the fatal dose given; this would 
have caused confi rmation bias without making clear that this 
dose should be divided by 24 to calculate the correct dose of 
1.2 ml per hour. Both nurses omitted to divide by 24 because 
and both obtained 28.8; the bag’s presentation of this wrong 
number helped mislead them (confi rmation bias).
One wonders why the manufacturers of the pump and the 
programmers of the pharmacy label printing system did not 
perform experiments to help improve the products — the 
RCA experiment only took 2 hours! Indeed, such evaluation is 
required by international standards, such as ISO 62366 Medical 
devices — Application of usability engineering to medical 
devices,15 which require manufacturers to identify hazards, 
perform experiments and have an iterative design process.
If simple experiments had been done during manufacture of 
the Abbott pump, serious harm could have been designed out.
IT or embedded IT?
The design problems above are not limited to particular sorts of 
IT. The examples present a varied mixture of IT systems, both 
ones typically used on PCs and those hidden inside devices 
and handhelds, using so-called embedded computers. This 
paper therefore uses the term ‘IT’ to mean either or any sort of 
computer-based system, particularly ones with user interfaces 
that are operated by front line staff.
Why are these problems not more widely recognised?
If preventable error is the third biggest killer, why do we know 
so little about it? 
There is widespread ignorance of these issues for a number of 
reasons. It is clearly not in the interest of device manufacturers 
to draw attention to weaknesses in their products, but equally 
the system of reporting within healthcare is defi cient. Error 
reporting systems are cumbersome and focused on overt 
clinical incidents, set in a culture of silence and blame, rather 
than transparency and learning.16,17 
When programming infusion pumps, staff tend to 
‘workaround’ design weaknesses. When a dose error occurs it 
will rarely be reported if it is recognised and corrected without 
harm to the patient. If harm does occur, staff are fearful the 
emphasis is on blame rather than learning, particularly as the 
blame tends to be focused on the healthcare professional and 
rarely the design. 
Report feedback is often minimal, with no opportunity for 
learning. All this leads to a culture of silence18 –20 whereby 
reporting is minimised and tends only to occur when an 
incident is overt and serious: few incidents that become visible 
seem all the more outrageous.
Blame loses the opportunity to synthesise and learn from near 
misses. A radical change is needed to create an emphasis on 
learning rather than blame; transparency rather than secrecy. 
From problems to solutions
When you get cash from a cash machine there is a risk that you 
put your card in, key in your PIN code, grab your cash and 
walk away leaving your card behind. So instead of that disaster, 
cash machines now force you to take your card before they will 
give you any cash. You went there to get cash, and you won’t 
go away until you have it — so you automatically pick up your 
card. This is a simple story of redesigning a system to avoid a 
common error. Notice that the design has eliminated a type of 
error without having to retrain anybody. 
In the NHS, the UK’s largest employer, any solution to 
problems that relies on retraining the workforce is not going to 
be very successful. Instead, we should redesign the systems: if 
IT is designed properly then it will be safer. 
How can we achieve this?
The common thread in the problems listed in this article is 
that errors go unnoticed, and then, because they are unnoticed, 
they are unmanaged, and then they may lead to harm. With 
no help from the system, if a user does not notice an error, they 
cannot think about it and avoid its consequences (except by 
chance). This truism is explored in detail by Kahneman, who 
describes the two human cognitive systems (fast perception and 
slow thinking) we use.21
Fig 1 demonstrates how slow thinking (Kahneman’s system 2) 
can only know about the world through what it sees using 
system 1. System 1, our perception, is fast and effortless, like 
a refl ex; whereas system 2, our conscious thinking, is logical 
and powerful, but requires effort. Many errors occur when 
system 2 delegates decisions to system 1, in so called attribute 
substitution.21 
Poorly designed healthcare systems do not work because 
IT systems do not detect errors, so the human perception 
(system 1) fails warn we need to think logically (system 2), to 
fi x those errors. The analogy with human teamwork is helpful: 
in a good team, other people help spot errors we do not notice, 
and thus the team as a whole is safer. IT rarely behaves like a 
team player helping spot errors, which leads to unrecognised 
errors.
Reporting errors and near misses
If learning is to occur, and problems prevented at source, 
errors and near misses must be detected, recognised and also 
reported and analysed. To enable this, systems must highlight 
potential errors, and when something goes wrong, or a near 
miss, the event should be recorded. If this is done using a 
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national structure,20,23,24 both local and central analysis would 
be simplifi ed and learning enhanced. In turn, if we do not 
learn, we will have no evidence-based insights into improving 
healthcare. 
It is important to remember that error logs are unreliable and 
should never be used as evidence unless they are forensically 
verifi ed (which generally is impossible). For example, in the 
B-Braun a nurse might enter 0.01 but a log would show they had 
entered 0.1.
Making informed purchasing decisions
The Kahneman model explains why errors can go undetected, 
and also why bad IT systems are purchased. As individuals, 
we get excited about the latest technology, and easily lose a 
rational approach to what best meets our requirements — this 
is attribute substitution. Thinking (system 2 work) carefully 
about IT is diffi cult, so it is easier to substitute easy (system 1) 
features. Unfortunately, many people think they are skilled at 
deciding which IT systems best meet their needs, but this is 
illusory. Kahneman has termed this the illusion of skill.
This is why we all rush to buy the latest hand-held device, 
despite the fact that it won’t necessarily meet our clinical needs. 
If it is cheaper than competitors or a discount is offered on the 
contract we are even more likely to buy it. The same irrationalities 
apply in the workplace, and are discussed well by Kahneman.
Makary gives a brilliant discussion of the misleading 
temptations of hospital robotics.25 What is perfect for 
consumerism is a disaster for hospital procurement.26 The latest 
shiny gizmo is not necessarily the best or the safest. We have to 
change things: what we like and what manufacturers want us to 
want are not necessarily what patients need.
The EU found the same problem with consumers buying 
tyres. European Union legislation now requires tyres to show 
their stopping distance, noise level and fuel effi ciency at the 
point of sale. An example is shown in Fig 2. The legislation 
follows on from similar schemes to show energy effi ciency in 
white goods. Customers want to buy better products, so now 
when they buy tyres, they can see these factors and use them to 
inform their decision making. 
The EU has not said how to improve tyres, they have just 
required the quality to be visible. A complex thinking process 
(which system 2 is bad at) has been replaced by a visible rating 
(which system 1 is good at). 
Now manufacturers, under competition, work out how to 
make their products more attractive to consumers using the 
critical measures. Indeed, thanks to energy effi ciency labeling, 
product effi ciency has improved, in some cases so much so that 
the EU has extended the scales to A*, A**, A***. The point is, 
normal commercial activity now leads to better products.
By analogy with tyres, medical devices should show safety 
ratings – ones that are critical and that can be assessed 
objectively. Safety ratings would stimulate market pressure to 
start making improvements.
It is easy to measure tyre stopping distances; clearly, stopping 
before an obstacle instead of hitting it is preferable. There is 
no similar thinking in healthcare about safety. Therefore any 
measurement process has to be combined with a process to 
improve, even create, the measurements and methodologies 
themselves. 
It is interesting to read critiques of pharmaceutical 
development4 and realise that in pharmaceuticals there is a 
consensus scientifi c methods should be used (even if the science 
actually done has shortcomings). By contrast, for healthcare 
IT and devices there isn’t even any awareness that things need 
evaluating. 
Conclusions
Today’s enthusiasm for IT and exciting medical devices recalls 
the original enthusiasm for X-rays. Clarence Dally, an early 
adopter, suffered radiation damage and died from cancer only 
Fig 1. Schematic rings representing Kahneman’s two cognitive sys-
tems – what goes on inside our heads. Our conscious thinking (system 2) 
can know nothing about the world apart from what our perceptual system 
tells it (eg our eyes and ears are in system 1), and in turn almost all of 
healthcare is mediated by technologies. Reproduced with permission.22
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Fig 2. Example EU product performance labels. Tyre label (left) and 
energy effi ciency label for white goods, like freezers (right). The A–G scale 
has A being best. Note how the scales combine several measures of perfor-
mance. Reproduced with permission.22
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a few years after Röntgen’s fi rst publication.27 It is now obvious 
that X-rays carry risks and have to be used carefully.
Today’s healthcare IT is badly designed; the culture blames 
users for errors, thus removing the need to closely examine 
design. Moreover, manufacturers often require users to sign 
‘hold blameless’ contracts,28 which effectively make the users 
the only people left to blame. When errors occur, even near 
misses, a transparent system of reporting would enhance 
opportunities for learning and improvement, provided it is 
correct and used in a supportive culture, rather than one of 
blame and retribution. The current system of inaccuracy, 
confi dentiality and blaming users means the sorts of issues 
discussed in this paper do not get any light shone on them.
Mortality rates in hospitals can double when computerised 
patient record systems are introduced:29 computers are not 
the unqualifi ed ‘X-ray’ blessings they are often promoted as 
being. A safety-labeling scheme would raise awareness of the 
issues and stimulate competition for safer devices and systems. 
It could be done voluntarily with no regulatory burden on 
manufacturers. By fi xing rating labels on devices for their 
lifetime, patients would also gain increased awareness of the 
issues, and they would surely help pressurise for better systems.
We need to improve. Kimberley Hiatt, Kaia Zautner, Denise 
Melanson and many other people might still be alive if the 
calculators, infusion pumps, robots, linear accelerators and so 
forth used in their care had been designed with more attention 
to the possibility of error.
This article was adapted from a lecture transcript presented 
at Gresham College, London on 11 February 2014. The lecture 
and transcript can be accessed using the following link: www.
gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/designing-it-to-make-
healthcare-safer. ■
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